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This paper examines the impact of trade facilitation on 
intra-African trade. The authors examine the role of trade 
facilitation reforms, such as increased port efficiency, 
improved customs, and regulatory environments, and 
upgrading services infrastructure on trade between 
African countries. They also consider how regional trade 
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agreements relate to intra-African trade flows. Using trade 
data from 2003 to 2004, they find that improvement in 
ports and services infrastructure promise relatively more 
expansion in intra-African trade than other measures. 
They also show that, almost all regional trade agreements 
have a positive effect on trade flows. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
World trade has expanded faster than economic growth and has been a vehicle for raising the 
standard of living in OECD countries. African countries have not seen similar trade 
expansion. Africa's share of world exports has dropped by nearly 60 percent---from 3.5 
percent in 1970 to 1.5 percent in 1999, representing a staggering income loss of $70 billion 
annually, an amount equivalent to 21 percent of the region's GDP and to more than five times 
the $13 billion in annual aid flows to Africa (World Bank, 2003). The dismal performance of 
African trade can be attributed to several factors traditionally associated with growth, 
institutions, customs environment and infrastructure.  
 
Rodrik (1998) finds that the trade/GDP ratios of Sub-Saharan African countries are 
comparable to those of countries of similar size and income, and that Africa's marginalization 
in world trade is mainly due to low income growth. Fosu (2003) shows that coups d'état have 
an adverse effect on African export growth that is higher than their effect on GDP. Clarke 
(2005) finds that African manufacturing enterprises are less likely to export in countries with 
restrictive trade and customs regulation and poor customs administration. Longo and Sekkat 
(2004) examine the possibility of expanding intra-African trade with a gravity model, but also 
pay attention to obstacles to intra-regional trade. They show that insufficient infrastructure, 
mismanagement of economic policies and internal political tensions are the main obstacles to 
trade in African countries. Limao and Venables (2001) also show that poor infrastructure 
accounts for 40 percent of predicted transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60 percent 
for landlocked countries. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Limao and Venables 
conclude that intra-SSA trade costs are substantially higher and trade volumes substantially 
lower than those for non-SSA countries.  
 
Also, in Africa, relatively high trading costs at the border, low resource complementarities 
between member countries, small market size, and poor transport infrastructure limit both 
intra- and inter-regional trade (Yang and Gupta, 2007; Foroutan and Pritchett,1993; Njinkeu 
and Powo Fosso, 2006).  
 
While several of the above fall in the overall trade facilitation debate, none of the studies has 
explicit focus on the competitiveness agenda of African countries as pursued in various trade 
facilitation options including those considered in the autonomous policy debate or ongoing multilateral (WTO) or bilateral (the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)) trade 
negotiations. This paper addresses the role of the trade facilitation in promoting intra-African 
trade. To do this, we extend the gravity model considered in the literature (see Wilson et al 
2003a, 2003b, 2004; Clark et al 2004; and OCDE, 2007), with focus on the role of port 
efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment, and services infrastructure. 
    Using a panel data that cover years 2003 and 2004 on a sample of 100 countries which 
includes 25 African countries, we find that port efficiency and services infrastructure have a 
positive impact on African trade but that customs and regulatory environments are the factors 
that lower intra-African trade. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the review of literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and estimation framework. Section 4 discusses the results while 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Previous studies 
Empirical studies on trade facilitation are very recent. Following Fox et al (2003) and OECD 
(2003), Denis (2006) uses the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Computable General 
Equilibrium model to investigate the impact of trade facilitation and regional integration in 
the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. He shows that both intra-regional and 
integration with European Union (EU) have a favourable effect on welfare in the MENA 
region. With the addition of trade facilitation improvements to trade liberalization, the welfare 
gains from integrating with the EU increase from US $ 1.8 billion to US $ 7.2 billion (0.82 
percent increase to base GDP) whereas the welfare gains from intra-regional integration 
increase from US $ 913 million to US $ 3 billion (0.1 percent  increase to base GDP). 
      APEC (1999) uses the same GTAP model and finds that trade liberalization and trade 
facilitation could increase APEC countries’ income by US 75 billion (at 1997 prices, 0.4% of 
GDP). UNCTAD (2001) finds that a one percent reduction in the cost of maritime and air 
transport services in developing countries could increase global GDP by US 7 billion (1997 
value). 
 
Clark et al. (2004) find that improving port efficiency from the 25th to 75th percentiles 
reduces shipping costs by more than 12%. Wilson et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2004) show that port 
efficiency of both the importer and the exporter is positively associated with trade. Moreover, comparing the effect of port efficiency on imports versus exports, they find that the 
coefficient is higher for exporter than importer, which implies that global trade flows get a 
bigger boost when the exporter's port efficiency improve. For landlocked countries, Wilson, 
Mann and Otsuki (2003a) show that the ports are as important for both import and export as in 
non-landlocked countries. For island countries, it appears that ports are more important for 
their import and less important for their export compared to non-island countries. Similar 
result was found by Limao and Venables (2001). 
Wilson et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2004) show that the customs environment has a significantly 
positive effect on trade of the importing country. Moreover, they argue that trade facilitation 
is a possible avenue for reducing the cost of imports through customs improvements. OECD 
(2007) uses a metrics of customs and administrative procedure from the World Bank "Doing 
Business" survey (2005) to estimate a gravity model. The study concludes that all countries 
can benefit from more efficient customs and administrative procedures, with the greatest 
benefits accruing to those reforming countries with the least efficient customs and 
administrative procedures. 
 
Wilson et al (2003a, 2003b, 2004) find that improving the regulatory environment of the 
importer and exporter has a positive and significant association with trade. De Groot et al. 
(2003) also show that a better quality of formal institutions tend to increase trade. Rodrik et al 
(2002) conclude that the quality of institutions has a significant and positive effect on 
country's total trade flows. Otsuki et al. (2001) find that African export of cereals, nuts and 
dried fruits will decline by 4.3 (cereals) and 11 (nuts and dried fruits) percents with a 10 
percent tighter European Union standard on aflatoxin contamination levels of these products. 
Francois and Manchin (2007) also find that exports performance depend on institutional 
quality. 
 
Wilson et al (2003a, 2003b, 2004) use the percentage of companies that use the internet for e-
commerce to assess the effect of internet. They conclude that E-business usage has a positive 
and significant effect on trade. Freund and Weinhold (2004) show that an increase by 10 
percent in the relative number of web hosts could increase by one percent the country’s trade 
flow. Choi (2003) shows that when the number of the internet hosts or users in a host country 
increased by 10 percent, the foreign direct investment inflows increased by more than 2 
percent. Fink et al. (2005) suggest that a 10 percent decrease in the bilateral calling price is associated with an 8 percent increase in bilateral trade. Francois and Manchin (2007) also find 
that exports performance depend on communications infrastructure. 
 
In general relatively high trading costs at the border, low resources complementary between 
member countries, small market size, and poor transport infrastructure limit both intra- and 
inter-regional African trade (Yang and Gupta, 2007; Foroutan and Pritchett,1993; Njinkeu and 
Powo Fosso, 2006).  
 
Studies on trade facilitation in African countries are scarce. Using estimates from a gravity 
model, Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2008) estimate ad-valorem equivalents of improvements 
in national trade-cost indicators, measured by the Logistic Performance Indicators and Doing 
Business, for African countries. They found that the gains for African exporters from 
improving trade logistics half-way to the level in South Africa are more important than a 
substantive cut in tariffs.  For example, improving trade logistics to lower costs in Ethiopia 
half-way to the level in South Africa is approximately equivalent to a 7.5 percent cut in tariffs 
faced by Ethiopian exporters.  Njinkeu, Wilson and Powo Fosso (2007) present the trade 
facilitation agenda for Africa, and discuss alternative methodologies for measuring the impact 
of trade facilitation on trade.  
 
Longo and Sekkat (2004) suggest that improvements in the transport infrastructure indicators 
(length road per capita and number of telephone per capita) by 1 percent in one country can 
boost intra-African trade by about 2 percent. Using a gravity model, Limao and Venables 
show that poor infrastructure accounts for 40 percent of predicted transport costs for coastal 
countries and up to 60 percent for landlocked countries. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), Limao and Venables conclude that intra-SSA trade costs are substantially higher and 
trade volumes substantially lower than those for non-SSA countries. Clarke (2005) shows that 
African firms engaged in manufacturing are less likely to export in countries with restrictive 
trade, cumbersome customs regulation, and poor customs administration. 
 
In this paper, we use the gravity model of bilateral trade in the African countries and the Rest 
of the world, and include a set of trade facilitation indicators (port efficiency, customs and 
regulatory environment, and services infrastructure) as well as incorporate tariffs and regional 
trade agreements to see which of these factors might have a greater effect on intra-African 
trade flows. 3. Methodology 
3.1 Rationale for trade facilitation measures 
 
The main impediment to quantitative analysis of trade facilitation is availability of properly 
defined and measured development of trade facilitation indicators. Wilson, Mann and Otsuki 
(2003a, 2003b, 2004) present four distinct approaches that meet policymakers' needs. They 
are: (i) port efficiency, (ii) customs environment, (iii) regulatory environment, and (iv) 
services sector infrastructure. 
 
Port efficiency (PE) is designed to measure the quality of infrastructure of maritime and air 
ports. Customs environment (CE) is aimed at measuring direct customs costs as well as 
administrative transparency of customs and border crossings. Regulatory environment (RE) is 
designed to measure the economy's approach to regulations. Services infrastructure sector (SI) 
is designed to measure the extent to which an economy has the necessary domestic 
infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, financial intermediaries, and logistic firms) and is 
using networked information to improve efficiency and to transform activities to enhance 
economic activity. 
 
These trade facilitation measures have parallel with GATT articles covered in the trade 
facilitation negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and the bilateral 
negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between African regions and the 
European Union. The negotiation mandate in the DDA for example is provided by Annex D 
of the July 2004 Framework as follows: “Negotiations shall aim to clarify and improve 
relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994 with a view to further 
expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit.
5  
Negotiations shall also aim at enhancing technical assistance and support for capacity 
building in this area.  The negotiations shall further aim at provisions for effective cooperation 
between customs or any other appropriate authorities on trade facilitation and customs 
compliance issues.”  WTO (2004) 
 
The port efficiency measure has been constructed in accordance with GATT article V 
(freedom of transit). This article deals with free movement of goods, which should be allowed 
                                                 
5 It is understood that this is without prejudice to the possible format of the final result of the negotiations and 
would allow consideration of various forms of outcomes. to move via most convenient route, should be exempt from customs or transit duties, and 
should be free from unnecessary delays or restrictions.  
 
The definition of custom environment used in this paper addresses the concerns of GATT 
article VIII. GATT article VIII states that in order to minimize impediments to trade due to 
customs procedures, fees charged by customs officials must be limited to the approximate 
cost of customs services. Also, there should not be substantial penalties for minor breaches of 
customs regulations such as clerical errors.   Regulatory environment issues are addressed in 
GATT article X which discusses Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations. This 
article comes from the basic transparency obligation that requires prompt publication of laws 
and regulations affecting imports and exports so that foreign governments and traders may 
clearly understand them. 
 
3.2 Defining and measuring trade facilitation indicators 
 
Trade facilitation indicators, in this paper, are constructed from the Global Competitiveness 
Report (GCR) produces by the World Economic Forum (WEF).
6 The GCR is an annual 
publication that aims to enhance global understanding of the factors influencing private-sector 
led economic growth and explains why some countries are much more successful than others 
at creating new employment opportunities and raising the income level of their respective 
populations. For participating countries, the GCR reports on performance and policy 
conditions affecting the ability of private sector firms to be globally competitive -- able to 
create and add value within the global marketplace.  WEF has expanded its worldwide 
country coverage from 75 countries in 2001, to 125 countries in 2006's GCR. Particular 
attention has been paid to including more countries from Africa, as well as several from 
Central Asia, given the increasing importance of this region on the global stage
7. This 
database offers then the opportunity for a focus on Africa in a manner that was not possible 
with previous data sets. 
After developing the trade facilitation measures, the next stage in creating the trade 
facilitation indicators involves collecting the GCR's indexed inputs into the four specific 
                                                 
6   Our approach is therefore different from that followed by Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2004) who used three 
survey (Kaufmann, Kraay,and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
2001-2002, and IMD Lausanne, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002). 
7 For example, the number of African countries has increased from 5 countries (Egypt, Mauritius, Nigeria, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe) in 2001 to 25 countries in 2006. 
 facilitation measures. Each index ranges from 0 to 7 with a low value meaning poor, and a 





■ Port efficiency for each country is the average of two indices namely port infrastructure 
quality and air transport infrastructure quality.  Customs environment is the average of two 
indices representing irregular payments in imports and exports and the business cost of 
corruption. The regulatory environment is the average of three indices representing their 
regular payment in public contracts, favouritism in decisions of government officials, and 
public trust of politicians. The services sector infrastructure for each country is the average of 
the quality of competition in internet service providers (ISP) sector and the extent of 
marketing. 
 
Tables 1 present, for the trade facilitation indicators, the mean, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum values for the different samples. As expected, the statistics are very low in 
Africa compared to other regions. The comparison is interesting if we contrast individual 
countries or regional integration agreements. Tables 2 and 3 show that for our sample services 
infrastructure indicators are highly correlated with port efficiency (0.822), customs 
environment (0.737) and regulatory environment (0.721). Port, customs and regulatory 
environment are strongly correlated with each other. Port efficiency is highly correlated with 
gross national income (GNI) per capita. Moreover, GNI is highly correlated with per capita 
GNI. When we limit ourselves to the African sample, the correlations between trade 
facilitation indicators are low compared to the correlations in the whole. Two reasons can 
explain this (Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki, 2004; therefore WMO). First explanation stems from 
the fact that trade facilitation indicators are different facets of overall trade facilitation and 
secondly some elements of trade facilitation (administrative transparency, available resources 
to build quality ports, and so on) are more prevalent in higher income economies than in 
developing countries. 
 
Port efficiency, customs environment, services infrastructure and regulatory environment may 
induce reforms that improve with a country's import and export flows and the estimated 
                                                 
8 This applies for Cameroon and Senegal where we use the data of the previous year for the year 2004. 
 coefficients for these variables would be biased particularly due to possible endogeneity 
associated with high correlations between the trade facilitation and income variables. WMO 
(2003a, 2003b) however find weak evidence of endogeneity. 
 
Other variables not explicitly associated with trade facilitation are also defined in the 
database. These include for example the bilateral trade flows in manufactured goods. The 
trade flow data aggregate the trade flows over the manufactured goods for a given importer-
exporter pair. We use import data as it is likely to be more reliable than export data since 
imports constitute a tax base and governments have an incentive to track import data. We 
deflate the trade flow with the world import index taken from IFS.  We use weighted average 
of applied tariff rates obtained from UNCTAD TRAINS for the manufactured goods under 
the above definition where bilateral trade values corresponding to each tariff line are used as 
the weighted gross national income (GNI) and GNI per capita data. Consumer price index and 
GDP deflator are taken from the World Development Indicators database.  Geographic data 
and the dummies for same language and colonial links are extracted from the Centre d'Études 
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) database
9.  The distance data are 
calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the 
relevant capital cities. 
 
3.3. The empirical model 
The gravity model, is a short-hand representation of supply and demand forces in which the 
amount of trade between countries is assumed to be increasing in their sizes (as measured by 
their national incomes), and decreasing in the cost of transportation between them (as 
measured by the distance between their economic centers).  By assuming first Cobb-Douglas 
preferences and then CES preferences, Anderson (1979) was the first to derive the gravity 
equations from models that assumed product differentiation. In both cases, he made the 
Armington assumption that products were differentiated by country of origin. Anderson and 
Wincoop (2003) developed a method that consistently and efficiently estimated a theoretical 
gravity equation, and correctly calculates the comparative statistics of trade frictions.  
 
Anderson and Wincoop (2004) introduced the border costs as premium on the export prices.  
In the so called augmented gravity models, most authors (e.g. Carrere, 2004; Musila, 2005; 
                                                 
9 http://cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distance.htm 
 Frankel and al., 1995; Glick and Rose, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2001; Rose and 
Engel, 2002; Longo and Sekkat 2004; Wilson et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2004) add other variables 
such as income per capita, adjacency, common language, common currency, or colonial links. 
The augmented gravity model of trade has also been used widely as a baseline model for 
estimating the impact of a variety of policy issues including, regional trading groups (Carrere, 
2004; Musila, 2005, Longo and Sekkat 2004), political blocs (Frankel et al, 1995), currency 
unions (Glick and Rose, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2001; Rose and Engel, 2002; 
Carrere, 2004), and trade facilitation (Limao and Venable, 2001; Wilson et al, 2003a, 2003b, 
2004; Clark et al, 2004). We follow this approach.  
    In our sample, zero or missing bilateral trade observations reaches 43.53% of the total. 
Since the dependant variable is truncated at zero, estimation with OLS will produce biased 
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where i and j stand for exporter and importer respectively, and t is trading year (t=2003, 
2004). F
t
ij denotes the value of manufacture exports from country j to i at year t. TARIFF
t
ij  is 
the applied tariff rate in the percent ad valorem term that is specific to trading partners i and j 
and year t. The terms PE, CE, RE, and SI denote country's indicators of port efficiency, 
customs environment, regulatory environment, and service infrastructures. The term GNI 
denotes the gross national income and GNIPC denotes per capita GNI. Dummy variables are 
included in the model to capture the effect of preferential trade agreements, language 
similarity and adjacency. The trade arrangements dummies (see the appendix for the 
definitions of different trade arrangements) include AMU (DAMU), CEMAC (DCEMAC), 
COMESA (DCOMESA), ECOWAS (DECOWAS), SADC (DSADC), UEMOA (DUEMOA), ASEAN 
(DASEAN), NAFTA (DNAFTA), LAIA (DLAIA), AUNZ (DAUNZ), MERCOSUR (DMERCOSUR), and 
EU (DEU). The language dummies include English (DENG), French (DFRC), Spanish (DSPN), 
Chinese (DCHN), Arabic (DARB), German (DGMN), Portuguese (DPOR), and Russian language (DRUS). The adjacency dummy DADJ takes the value one if country i is adjacent to country j 
and zero otherwise. Geographical distance between capital cities i and j is denoted DiSTii. b0 
is the intercept, D2003 is a dummy for year t (t = 2003). This dummy is included in the model 
to control for time-specific shocks. bi  is a country-specific effect when a country is an 
exporter. Parameters b’s are the coefficients. ɛij(t) is the error term that is assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero. 
 
In the literature, it has been found that poorly-performing ports can strongly reduce trade 
volumes and may have a greater dampening effect on trade for small, less-developed 
countries than many other trade frictions (Wilson et al, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Clark et al, 
2004). Thus we may expect that improvement of port infrastructure affects positively the 
trade flows. 
 
Customs is a mandatory element in the movement of goods across borders and the procedures 
apply to these goods significantly influence the role of national industry in international trade 
and their contribution to the national economy. Effective and efficient clearance of goods 
increases the participation of national industry in the world marketplace and contributes to 
economic competitiveness of nations, encourages investment and development of industry, 
and increases the small and medium enterprises in international trade (World Customs 
Organization). 
 
Well developed institutions are likely to decrease the transaction costs for market participants 
and thus increase the efficiency of markets. They can do this through three channels (World 
Bank, 2002). (i) They decrease information asymmetries as they channel information about 
market conditions, participants and goods; (ii) They reduce risk as they define and enforce 
property rights and contracts, determining who gets what and when, and (iii) They increase 
competition in markets or decrease it. The improvements of the regulatory environment will 
affect trade positively. 
 
Services infrastructure sector (SI) is designed to measure the extent to which an economy has 
the necessary domestic infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, financial intermediaries, and 
logistic firms) and is using networked information to improve efficiency and to transform 
activities to enhance economic activity. For example, the Internet can improve the productivity in three ways. (i) Internet can lower prices by lowering search costs; (ii) Internet 
use can cut the cost of holding inventories by allowing large suppliers to bypass retailers and 
contact customers directly; and (iii) Internet usage can improve the transparency of the host 
countries and make it comfortable to do business. It is expected that the improvement of SI 
will have a positive impact on the trade. 
 
Because trade flows are expected to be positively related to national incomes, and negatively 
related to distance, b10 and b11 are expected to be positive and b14 is expected to be negative. 
Trade flows are also expected to be positively associated with regional integration, language, 
and adjacency. 
 
In contrast to cross-section data, panel data permit more general types of heterogeneity. For a 
single cross-section, these controls can only depend on observed country-pair attributes such 
as common language, and estimates can thus be biased if there is additionally an observed 
component to the country-pair propensity to trade. With panel data, such heterogeneity can be 
controlled through a country-pair fixed effect. In this paper, we use country-specific effect 
when a country is an exporter. With this specification, distance, adjacency, and language are 
eliminated because they are fixed over time
10. 
 
We use three sub-samples. The first concerns bilateral trade flows between 100 countries. The 
second is, a sample comprising 25 African countries (see table 8 in appendix). The last one 
concerns intra-African trade and trade with the rest of the world
11. The coefficients of the 
three sub-samples are assumed stable over the period 2003-2004.  
 
                                                 
10 See Cheng and Wall (2005) for the various specifications to controlling for heterogeneity in the 
gravity models of trade. 
 
11 Due to endogeneity problem and space, we don't present the results of the estimations with GNI per 
capita as regressor. However, the results with all the variables, including GNI per capita, are available 
on request to the authors 
 4. The results 
(i) Whole sample 
 
In this section, we extended the Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (WMO) (2003a, 2003b, 2004)
12 
sample to include 25 countries primarily from Africa. We have also captured the effect of 
African regional integration schemes. The gravity model was run using an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with the Huber/White robust standard error. 
 
The coefficients of ports efficiency of both the importer and the exporter are positively 
associated with trade. Comparing the effect of port efficiency on import vs. exports, we find, 
as did WMO, that the coefficient is higher for exporter than importer (see table 4). Customs 
environment of the importer is significant and positively related to trade in pooled cross-
section and year 2003 fixed effect regressions, while the customs coefficient of the exporter is 
not significant. This implies that global trade flows get a bigger boost when the importer's 
customs environment improves. The regulatory environment of the exporter is significant and 
negatively associated to trade in all regressions. The regulatory environment of the importer is 
insignificant. The services infrastructure coefficient of the importer is significant and 
positively associated with trade in all regressions, while services infrastructure of the exporter 
is not significant. 
 
African regional agreements, namely, CEMAC, COMESA, SADC, and UEMOA, have a 
positive and significant effect on trade. When we use the year 2003 and exporter fixed effects, 
coefficients of regional trade agreements become significant and positively related to trade. 
We applied the Tobit model (table 5) on the whole sample countries to take into account 
missing or zero trade. We also added a dummy to isolate the effect of intra-African trade. The 
results (see third column of table 5) show that when African countries trade among them, the 
world trade increases significantly. 
 
In the pooled cross-section regression, tariff is negative and significant. In the fixed effects 
regressions, it becomes insignificant but remains negative. For the trade facilitation indicators, 
port efficiency of exporter is positive and significant whereas port efficiency of importer 
                                                 
12 The results obtained with WMO's sample are very similar with the previous one. These results are 
available on request to the authors. 
 country is negative and not significant in pooled cross-section regression and year 2003 fixed 
effects. This means that importer country must improve their port infrastructure to be 
competitive in the global market. The customs environment variable of both the importer and 
the exporter is positively associated with trade in the fixed effect regressions. Comparing the 
effect of customs environment on import vs. exports, we note that the coefficient is higher for 
the importer than the exporter. The regulatory environment of the importer has significant and 
positive effect on trade whereas regulatory environment of the exporter has significant and 
negative effect. The services infrastructure variable of importer is significant and positive in 
all the regression whereas it is negative and significant for exporter country in the fixed effect 
regressions. 
 
When using pooled cross-section regression, CEMAC, COMESA, ECOWAS and SADC 
regional integration affects trade positively. The other African regional agreements (AMU, 
UEMOA) have not effect on trade. In the year fixed effect regression, all the African regional 
agreements are significant and positively associated with trade. 
 (ii) Intra-African Trade 
 
We use only the sample of 25 African countries as reporter (exporter) and partner (importer). 
Using a Tobit model, table 6 shows that port efficiency of both the importer and the exporter 
is positively associated with trade in the pooled cross-section regression. Comparing the effect 
of port efficiency on import vs. exports, we note that the coefficient is higher for importer 
than exporter. Because the dependant variable is the value of manufacture exports, this result 
can be explained by the fact that African countries are net importer of manufactured goods. 
The customs environment of the importer has a significant and negative effect on trade. The 
policy implication of this result is that African countries must improve their customs 
environment to boost their economy.  The regulatory environment of the importer has 
significant and positive effect on trade whereas the regulatory environment of the exporter has 
significant and negative effect. Only services infrastructure of the importer is positively 
associated with trade. The services infrastructure of the exporter is insignificant. 
 
A comparison of the results of the fixed effects and pooled cross-section shows that allowing 
for year 2003 fixed effect and exporter heterogeneity (see second and third column of table 6) 
lowers the absolute value of the trade facilitation indicators, and increase the estimated 
income elasticity of trade.  
The CEMAC, ECOWAS and UEMOA agreements are not significant and negatively related 
to trade in the pooled cross-section regression whereas AMU is significant and negatively 
related to trade. COMESA and SADC are significant and positively associated with trade. 
When we use the fixed effect regressions, all the African regional agreements become 
significant and positively related to trade. 
Tariff is positive and significantly associated with trade. This means that for African 
countries, tariff is not a constraint for trade contrary to non tariff barriers that appear to be the 
main challenge for African countries. 
 
(iii) Intra-African Trade with the Rest of the World 
 
We use a sample of African countries as reporter (exporter) and partner (importer) and other 
countries as partner (importer) only. Using a Tobit model, table 7 shows that tariff is still 
significant and positively related to trade. Port efficiency of both the importer and the exporter 
is positively associated with trade. Comparing the effect of port efficiency on import vs. 
exports, we note that the coefficient is higher for importer than exporter. In contrast to the 
previous case, customs environment of the exporter is now positive (negative) and significant 
in pooled cross-section (fixed effect regression). The policy implication of this result is that 
African countries must improve their customs environment to boost their economy. 
Regulatory variable of both the importer and the exporter is positively associated with trade in 
exporter fixed effect regression. Comparing the effect of regulatory environment on import 
vs. exports, we note that the coefficient is higher for exporter than importer.  A comparison of 
the results of the fixed effects and pooled cross-section shows that allowing for year 2003 
fixed effect and exporter heterogeneity (see second and third column of table 7) lowers the 
absolute value of port efficiency, customs environment and services infrastructure 
coefficients, and increases the absolute value of regulatory environment coefficient. We also 
observe an increase of the estimated income elasticity of trade.  For regional agreements, we 
have the same results as described in the previous section. 
 5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine the impact of trade facilitation on intra-African trade. 
Port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment and services infrastructure are 
the measures of trade facilitation used. The results show that besides the traditional 
determinants of bilateral trade, port efficiency and services infrastructures are the factors that 
have a positive effect on African trade. On the other hand, customs and regulatory 
environments are the main obstacles to intra-African trade. Overall a coherent and 
comprehensive trade facilitation agenda should be an essential element of domestic reform. 
Negotiations at the WTO and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), especially because 
they explicitly recognize the need for technical assistance and capacity building, offer an 
opportunity. The further consensus about the relevance of trade facilitation to the aid for trade 
initiative confirms the centrality of the above conclusion for African countries (see Mugadza, 
2008). 
 
First, the customs environment is a key factor for accelerating trade among countries. 
Improvement of African countries' customs can generate positive spill-overs. Second, a good 
regulatory environment attracts foreign investment and facilitates the trade. 
    In our sample, 43.53% of importer-exporter pairings had zero bilateral trade. Thus apart 
from analyzing the effects of different variables on trade, we must also focus on factors that 
may explain why trade does not occur at all among countries. Employing a selection model 
allowed us to take account of this censoring process (Francois and Manchin, 2007).   
 
Appendix: Data sources and definitions  
 
The yearly data are constructed for 100 countries and 11 regional trade agreements spanning 
from 2003 to 2004. These data are computed from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 
released. by The World Economic Forum, the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
published by the World Bank, the International Financial Statistics (IFS) released by the 
International Monetary Funds, as well as the Commodity Trade (COMTRADE), and the 
Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) published by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The individual countries and regional 
trade agreements are presented in table 8.  
A.1 Real GNI  
For all countries, we deflate Gross National Income (GNI) (source: WDI) by the all-item 
consumer price index (CPI) for the baseyear 2000 (source: WDI) except for Serbia and 
Zimbabwe. For these two countries, we use GDP deflator (source: WDI) for the baseyear 
2000. 
A.2 Real GNI per capita 
For all countries, we deflate GNI per capita (source: WDI) with the CPI except for Serbia and 
Zimbabwe. For these countries, we use GDP deflator (source: WDI). 
A.3 Trade facilitation Indicators 
A.3.1 Port efficiency 
The Port efficiency for each country is the average of two indexed inputs from GCR: 
    ■ Port Infrastructure Quality (Port facilities and inland waterways in your country are: 1 = 
underdeveloped; 7 = as developed as the world's best) 
    ■ Air Transport Infrastructure Quality (Air Transport in your country is: 1 = infrequent and 
inefficient; 7 = as extensive and efficient as the world's best) 
 
A.3.2 Customs environment  
The customs environment for each country is the average of two indexed inputs from GCR: 
    ■ Irregular Payments in Imports and Exports (How common do firms in your industry give 
irregular extra payments or bribes connected with import and export permits: 1 = common; 7 
= never) 
    ■ Business Cost of Corruption (Do unfair or corrupt activities of other firms impose costs 
on your firm? 1 = impose large costs; 7 = impose no costs/not relevant) 
 
A.3.3 Regulatory environment  
The Regulatory environment for each country is constructed as the average of three indexed 
input from GCR: 
    ■ Irregular Payment in Public Contracts (How commonly do firms in your industry give 
irregular extra payments or bribes connected with public contracts/investment projects: 1 = 
common; 7 = never) 
    ■ Favoritism in Decisions of Government Officials (When deciding upon policies and 
contracts, government officials: 1 = usually favor well-connected firms and individuals; 7 = 
are neutral among firms and individuals)     ■ Public Trust of Politicians (Public trust in the honesty of the politicians is: 1 = very low; 
7 = very high) 
 
 A.3.4 Services sector infrastructure 
Services sector infrastructure for each country is the average of two indexed inputs from 
GCR: 
    ■ Quality of competition in Internet service providers (ISP) sector (Is competition among 
your country's ISP sufficient to ensure high quality, infrequent interruptions and low prices? 1 
= no; 7 = yes, equal to world's best) 
    ■ Extend of marketing (the extend of marketing in your country is: 1 = limited or primitive; 
7 = high and among the world's best sophisticated) 
     
A.4 Trade Flows 
The bilateral trade flows are bilateral trade in manufactured goods (source: COMTRADE), 
defined as commodities in categories 5 to 8 in SITC 1 digit industry except those in category 
68 (non-ferrous metals). The Trade flow data aggregate the trade flows over the manufactured 
goods for a given importer-exporter. We deflate the trade flow using the world import index 
(source: IFS). 
     
 A.5 Tariffs  
We use weighted average of applied tariff rates (source: TRAINS) for the manufactured 
goods under the above definition where bilateral trade values corresponding to each tariff line 
are used as the weight. 
 
A.6 Adjacency, language, colony, and distance 
Geographic data, together language and colonial links are extracted from the Centre d'Études 
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) database (see www.cepii.fr). Distance 
data are calculated following the geat circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of 
the relevant capital cities. References 
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Table 1: Trade Facilitation summary statistics 
Variables Mean  Std.  Deviation  Min  Max 
Whole sample        
Port  4.548  1.195        2.350       6.850 
Customs  4.757   1.115        2.500       6.800 
Regulatory  3.541     1.151  1.700    6.067 
Services  4.568      0.881        2.900  6.500 
African sample         
Port  3.414      0.992        1.450       5.450 
Customs  3.853      0.695          2.200       5.350 
Regulatory  3.003  0.671   1.867     4.633 
Services  3.482      0.714       1.550       4.950 
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report. 
















Corruption Bribes Favoritism 
Public 
Trust Internet  Marketing
Algeria 3.00 3.00 4.50 3.70  3.50 3.80  2.30 2.70 2.50 
Angola  2.00 2.70 3.40 2.80  2.80 2.10  1.50 2.70 2.20 
Botswana  3.00 4.30 5.10 4.50  4.50 4.40  4.70 2.90 4.00 
Cameroon  2.60 2.90 3.30 3.10  2.70 3.20  2.30 3.80 3.60 
Chad  1.30 1.70 2.30 2.10  2.20 1.90  1.50 1.60 1.50 
Egypt  3.90 4.00 4.40 4.00  4.50 3.80  2.90 4.70 3.80 
Ethiopia  1.40 5.00 4.30 3.10  3.40 3.00  2.20 1.40 2.10 
Gambia 4.10 4.90 4.60 3.80  3.80 4.10  3.30 4.30 2.70 
Ghana  3.20 3.50 3.90 3.60  3.50 3.20  2.80 3.80 3.70 
Kenya  2.90 4.70 3.40 2.50  2.40 2.60  2.00 3.70 4.10 
Madagascar  2.10 2.90 3.50 2.40  2.50 2.60  1.70 3.60 3.30 
Malawi 1.80 3.50 5.30 3.70  3.60 3.00  2.00 4.10 3.20 
Mali  1.20 2.80 3.40 2.80  2.70 3.10  2.00 3.40 2.20 
Mauritius  5.20 5.40 3.70 3.20  3.20 3.50  1.80 1.90 4.60 
Morocco  3.70 4.30 3.60 3.20  3.00 3.20  3.10 3.70 4.40 
Mozambique  2.20 3.20 3.30 2.90  2.90 2.40  1.80 3.10 2.40 
Namibia  4.90 4.80 4.40 3.50  3.60 3.20  3.10 4.00 3.90 
Nigeria 2.50 3.50 2.80 2.80  2.20 2.10  1.50 3.60 3.90 
Senegal 3.50 4.30 3.80 3.00  2.80 3.20  2.00 3.30 3.20 
South  Africa  4.60 6.00 4.60 4.70  3.80 3.40  3.10 4.20 5.20 
Tanzania  3.20 3.40 4.20 3.00  3.60 3.40  3.20 4.10 3.30 
Tunisia 4.50 4.90 5.30 4.50  4.60 4.70  4.60 4.00 4.20 
Uganda 2.10 3.20 3.20 3.00  2.60 2.60  2.00 4.10 2.80 
Zambia 1.70 3.50 4.00 3.10  3.20 3.10  1.70 3.60 3.30 
Zimbabwe  1.80 3.10 3.50 3.40  2.60 2.00  1.20 3.20 3.70 
             
AMU  3.73 4.07 4.47 3.80  3.70 3.90  3.33 3.47 3.70 
CEMAC  1.95 2.30 2.80 2.60  2.45 2.55  1.90 2.70 2.55 
COMESA  2.49 3.80 3.87 3.12  3.08 2.83  1.92 3.30 3.31 
ECOWAS  2.90 3.80 3.70 3.20  3.00 3.14  2.32 3.68 3.14 
SADC  2.95 3.89 4.09 3.38  3.30 3.01  2.35 3.40 3.55 
UEMOA  2.35 3.55 3.60 2.90  2.75 3.15  2.00 3.35 2.70 
AFRICA  2.90 3.82 3.91 3.30  3.21 3.10  2.42 3.42 3.35 
             
ASEAN 4.43 5.10 4.28 4.12  3.97 3.67  3.53 4.35 4.38 
AUNZ  5.95 6.25 6.55 6.20  6.25 5.20  4.80 5.30 5.65 
EU  5.27 5.71 5.95 5.27  5.21 4.27  3.93 4.98 5.55 
LAIA  3.04 3.83 4.56 3.25  3.45 2.61  1.77 4.20 4.04 
MERCOSUR  3.33 3.68 4.48 3.50  3.55 2.65  1.88 4.33 4.10 
NAFTA 5.07 5.70 5.43 4.67  4.77 3.70  3.43 5.33 5.63 
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Report. Table 3:  Simple Correlations 
 
Correlations: Whole Sample 
 Trade  Tariff  PE  CE  RE  SI  GNI  GNIPC  Distance 
Trade 1                
Tariff  0.021     1               
PE  0.409   -0.085     1             
CE  0.337    -0.056     0.758     1           
RE  0.319    -0.077     0.774     0.880    1         
SI 0.462      -0.028     0.808     0.727    0.676     1       
GNI  0.613     0.068     0.552  0.419   0.400  0.655     1     
GNIPC  0.447   -0.09     0.764     0.766   0.684    0.745   0.654   1   
Distance  -0.33     0.026     0.003  -0.034  -0.036    0.011     0.033  -0.071    1 
 
Correlations: Intra-Africa and Rest of the World Sample 
 Trade  Tariff  PE  CE  RE  SI  GNI  GNIPC  Distance 
Trade 1              
Tariff 0.116      1              
PE  0.338     0.106    1             
CE  0.249    0.118    0.500     1           
RE  0.238    0.244    0.594     0.813     1         
SI  0.285     0.106     0.513     0.410     0.445   1       
GNI  0.331     0.199   0.455     0.119    0.376     0.365    1     
GNIPC  0.2693    0.155    0.683  0.226    0.501   0.358    0.781  1   
Distance  -0.209    -0.11  0.072   -0.022  -0.066  0.054    -0.038  0.012     1 
 
Correlations: Intra-Africa Sample 
  Trade Tariff PE  CE  RE  SI  GNI  GNIPC Distance 
Trade 1               
Tariff  0.162     1               
PE  0.331     0.071     1             
CE  0.221     0.061     0.459    1           
RE  0.197     0.172     0.572     0.794     1         
SI  0.290     0.052     0.510     0.421     0.457     1       
GNI  0.298     0.159     0.456     0.036     0.352     0.380     1     
GNIPC  0.224     0.113     0.675     0.159     0.479     0.339     0.796    1   
Distance  -0.36   0.014     0.240     0.041     0.127     0.110     0.193   0.202     1 
Note: All variables are in logs.   
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report for 
trade facilitation indicators, COMTRADE for trade flows, UNCTAD TRAINS for tariffs, and World 
Bank World Development Indicators for GNI.  Table 4: Whole sample: OLS 





Error Coeff.  Std.  Error 
Constant   -16.687***    1.853     -24.333***    2.127    -25.703***    2.101    
Tariff   -1.431***    0.391   -1.886***    0.446    -1.740***  0.443 
Ports  Exporter  1.081***     0.136     1.089***     0.156    1.160***    0.155      
Ports  Importer  0.767***   0.150  0.725***     0.167    0.513***    0.167  
Custom  Exporter  0.403**  0.206  0.918***     0.256    0.358     0.231     
Custom  Importer  0.173     0.224   -0.067   0.254   -0.146     0.245     
Regulatory Exporter  -0.841***    0.155     -1.009***    0.183    -0.736***     0.173  
Regulatory  
Importer 0.154    0.158     0.476**      0.177    0.569***   0.175      
Services Exporter  0.205     0.175     -0.043    0.199    0.062    0.198      
Services  Importer  1.064***   0.215     0.844***    0.228    1.062***    0.226      
GNI   Exporter   0.694***    0.014     0.666***     0.015    0.666***     0.015     
GNI  Importer  1.144***     0.021     1.101***   0.021    1.124***     0.020     
Distance   -1.327***     0.024   - -  -  - 
AMU 0.332  0.474     3.190***     0.254    3.177***    0.207    
CEMAC 3.614**  1.331     6.376***    1.153    6.723***    1.283     
COMESA 0.995***      0.313     1.967***   0.359    1.934***     0.352 
ECOWAS 0.201    0.548     2.454***     0.698    2.515***   0.702 
SADC  1.956***     0.294     3.675***    0.321    3.517***  0.316 
UEMOA   3.614**    1.266     4.141**     1.404    3.875**  1.331      
ASEAN 2.175***    0.172  4.333***   0.155    4.141***     0.153 
NAFTA -0.261      0.505     2.163***    0.374    2.032***     0.388 
LAIA  0.970***     0.118     2.740***    0.124    2.833***   0.129     
AUNZ   1.610***     0.262     3.528***      0.124    3.416***      0.251 
MERCOSUR   0.322     0.250     0.911**     0.307    0.986***     0.301 
EU   -0.039      0.064  2.369***     0.062    2.351***     0.063     
English   0.679***    0.080  - -  -  - 
French   -0.068  0.156  - -  -  - 
Spanish   0.848***     0.102     - -  -  - 
Arab   0.173      0.366  - -  -  - 
Chinese   2.731***  0.207  - -  -  - 
German   -0.536**  0203    - -  -  - 
Portuguese   1.443***  0.283     - -  -  - 
Russian   2.006***  0.204  - -  -  - 
Adjacency   0.720***     0.115  - -  -  - 
Observations 19800    19800    19800   
R
2 0.693     0.601    0.605   
Note:  All non-dummy variables are in logs. The notations “*”, “**”, and “***” denote significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report for 
trade facilitation indicators, COMTRADE for trade flows, UNCTAD TRAINS for tariffs, and World 
Bank World Development Indicators for GNI. Table 5: Whole Sample: Tobit Model 
 Pooled  Cross-Section 
Year 2003 and Exporter 
Fixed Effects 
Intra Africa Trade 
Dummy and 2003 
Fixed Effect 
  Coeff.  Std. Error Coeff.  Std. Error  Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
Constant   -54.465***    4.770  -80.233***     4.983     -80.914***    4.994    
Tariff   -2.168**     1.021      -1.248     1.069      -1.432     1.072     
Ports Exporter  3.367***    0.372       3.154***     0.388       3.152***      
Ports Importer  -0.413    0.361      -0.551     0.373  -0.687*     0.374 
Custom Exporter  -1.115**    0.551  2.489***     0.626   3.237***     0.634 
Custom Importer  1.905***    0.536       3.690***     0.587       4.375***       
Regulatory Exporter  -1.022**   0.419      -2.793***     0.450   -3.399***  0.457 
Regulatory Importer  1.973***    0.394       1.300***     0.416       0.779*    0.421  
Services Exporter    -0.226      0.453      -1.175**     0.475  -0.812*    0.477 
Services Importer  5.591***     0.448      4.819***     0.466      5.195***     0.468 
GNI  Exporter   1.323***     0.033      1.321***  0.034  1.310***     0.034 
GNI  Importer  1.947***     0.035      1.908***     0.036   1.907***    0.036  
Distance   -2.227***     0.079    - -  -  - 
AMU  -0.625     2.268      8.241***     2.068       - - 
CEMAC  9.660*     4.857       16.313***    5.054       - - 
COMESA 3.411***    0.587       4.959***      0.607       - - 
ECOWAS 1.969*    1.197       5.991***     1.247       - - 
SADC 4.363***  0.551       7.391***     0.562  - - 
UEMOA  3.316     3.713       5.543     3.841       - - 
ASEAN -2.368**      1.120  1.518     1.158       1.808     1.164     
NAFTA -3.757*      1.985      -0.506     2.067      -0.604    2.076     
LAIA  2.335***     0.568       7.310***     0.528   7.203***     0.530    
AUNZ 0.497      4.824       3.325     5.049       3.314     5.072     
MERCOSUR 1.160  0.999       2.227**     1.026       3.216***   1.026     
EU -0.748**        0.306      3.288***    0.283   3.248***    0.285 
English  0.854***      0.191       - -  -  - 
French   1.692***    0.494       - -  -  - 
Spanish   4.397***    0.346      - -  -  - 
Arab   3.739**     1.257       - -  -  - 
Chinese   1.795    1.366       - -  -  - 
German   -2.612    1.630      - -  -  - 
Portuguese   5.865***    0.809       - -  -  - 
Russian   5.592***     1.267       - -  -  - 
Adjacency   0.446    0.355       - -  -  - 
Intra Africa trade 
dummy  - -  -  -  3.770***     0.257 
Observations 19800    19800    19800   
Log-likelihood  -46159.607      -46871.893        -46940.51   
Note:  All non-dummy variables are in logs. The notations “*”, “**”, and “***” denote significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report for 
trade facilitation indicators, COMTRADE for trade flows, UNCTAD TRAINS for tariffs, and World 
Bank World Development Indicators for GNI. Table 6: Intra Africa: Tobit Model 
  Pooled Cross-Section Year  2003 Fixed Effect   Exporter Fixed Effect  
 Coeff. 
Std. 
Error  Coeff.  Std. Error  Coeff.  Std. Error 
Constant   -66.081***  20.523 -115.210*** 20.988  -98.439***  21.256 
Tariff   10.362**  4.052  12.268**  4.312  8.256*  4.457 
Ports  Exporter  4.542***  1.458  1.216  1.516  1.386  1.487 
Ports  Importer  7.194***  1.547  6.352***  1.515  5.815***  1.503 
Custom  Exporter  3.153  2.941  3.146  3.439  2.365  3.114 
Custom  Importer  -6.430**  3.02  -6.367*  3.537  -7.136**  3.212 
Regulatory  
Exporter   -10.885***  2.656  -9.506***  2.887  -9.139***  2.801 
Regulatory Importer  5.461**  2.702  4.738  2.957  6.768**  2.904 
Services  Exporter  0.711    1.454  1.368  1.550  1.512  1.541 
Services  Importer  17.971***    1.818  17.899***  1.870  15.121***  1.990 
GNI Exporter   0.850***  0.177  1.058***  0.187  1.044***  0.185 
GNI Importer  0.398**  0.174  0.588***  0.181  0.738***  0.186 
Distance   -4.163***  0.642  - -  -  - 
AMU  -5.577*  3.258  9.901***  2.696  10.009***  2.679 
CEMAC  -2.470  4.999  8.970*  5.231  9.764*  5.135 
COMESA  2.628***  0.844  4.186***  0.866  4.368***  0.860 
ECOWAS  -1.691  1.700  3.292**  1.618  3.482**  1.607 
SADC  1.519*  0.873   5.603***  0.805  5.412***  0.801 
UEMOA  -0.122  4.700   7.318  4.821  6.714  4.793 
English   -1.211*     0.667  - -  -  - 
French  5.342***  1.109  - -  -  - 
Arab  4.853**  2.318  - -  -  - 
Portuguese   5.301***  1.700  - -  -  - 
Adjacency  2.223*  1.167  - -  -  - 
Observations  1200    1200    1200   
Log-likelihood  -2776.061    -2768.998    -2770.627   
Note:  All non-dummy variables are in logs. The notations “*”, “**”, and “***” denote significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report for 
trade facilitation indicators, COMTRADE for trade flows, UNCTAD TRAINS for tariffs, and World 
Bank World Development Indicators for GNI. Table 7: Intra Africa and Rest of world (only as partner): Tobit Model 








Constant  -119.909***  10.678  -162.977***  10.540  -149.413***  10.695 
Tariff  11.058***  2.160  14.477***  2.234  11.486***  2.303 
Ports  Exporter  2.461**  0.937  1.255  0.970  1.436  0.965 
Ports  Importer  8.615***  0.747  8.453***  0.754  8.107***  0.750 
Custom  Exporter  5.164***  1.379  -5.863***  1.535  -7.039***  1.428 
Custom  Importer  1.415  1.511  2.091  1.725  0.631  1.572 
Regulatory  Exporter  4.118***  1.049  6.485***  1.115  7.033***  1.078 
Regulatory  Importer  0.309  1.350  0.863  1.441  2.871**  1.420 
Services Exporter  -0.9078  1.125  -1.494  1.182  -1.252  1.175 
Services Importer  14.055***  0.855  13.514***  0.879  11.262***  0.945 
GNI Exporter   1.984***  0.089  1.900***  0.091  1.896***  0.091 
GNI  Importer  0.828***  0.085  0.973  0.088  1.087***  0.091 
Distance  -2.978***  0.265  - -  - - 
AMU  -5.527**     2.928  8.173***  2.539  8.214***  2.529 
CEMAC  3.172  4.826  15.193***  4.966  15.568***  4.900 
COMESA  6.296***  0.763  8.921***  0.774  9.075***  0.773 
ECOWAS  3.373**  1.525  8.249***  1.547  8.310***  1.539 
SADC  5.219***  0.753  9.490***  0.716  9.310***  0.715 
UEMOA  -0.114  4.601  7.075  4.680  6.551  4.663 
English   1.239***      0.381     - -  - - 
French   5.001***  0.745  - -  - - 
Arab   4.528**  1.805  - -  - - 
Portuguese   6.060***  1.055  - -  - - 
Colony dummy  1.075    1.146  - -    - 
Adjacency   2.731**  0.968  - -  - - 
Observations  4950    4950    4950   
Log-likelihood  -10283.827    -10436.04    -10424.171   
Note:  All non-dummy variables are in logs. The notations “*”, “**”, and “***” denote significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report for 
trade facilitation indicators, COMTRADE for trade flows, UNCTAD TRAINS for tariffs, and World  
Bank World Development Indicators for GNI.  
 Table 8: Sample and Definition of the Regional Trade Agreements  
Regional Trade Blocs   Countries Members  Main dates* 
CEMAC (Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa) 
Cameroon, Chad  1962, creation of the UDE (Equatorial 
Customs Union); 1964, revision and 
creation of the UDEAC (Central 
African Customs and Economic 
Union); 1973, revision of the UDEAC; 
end of the 1980s, failure of the 
compensation funds; 1994, revision 
and creation of the CEMAC 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of 
West African States) 
Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria  1975, creation of the ECOWAS; 1990, 
start of a more general scheme of intra-
regional liberalization  
COMESA (Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa) 
Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
1981, creation of the PTA (Eastern and 
Southern African Preferential Trade 
Area); end of 1980s, first reduction in 
the customs tariffs on intra-regional 
trade; 1993, revision and creation of 
the COMESA 
SADC (Southern African Development 
Community) 
Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
1980, creation of the SADCC 
(Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference); 1992, 
revision and creation of the SADC 
AMU (Arab Maghreb Union)  Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia  1989, creation 
UEMOA (West African Economic and 
Monetary Union) 
Mali, Senegal  1994, creation 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) 
Canada, Mexico, United States of 
America 
1992, creation 
LAIA (Latin American Integration 
Association) 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
1980, creation 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common 
Market) 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay   1991, creation 
AUNZ Australia,  New-Zealand   
ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
1967, creation 
EU  (European  Union)  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic 
(since 2004), Denmark, Estonia (since 
2004), Germany, Greece, Hungary 
(since 2004), Italia, Ireland, Finland, 
France, Latvia (since 2004), Lithuania 
(since 2004), Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland (since 2004), 
Portugal, Slovak Republic (since 
2004), Slovenia (since 2004), Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
1951, creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community; 1957, 
establishment of the European 
Community; 1994, revision and 
creation of the European Union 
Other countries  Bangladesh, Bulgaria, China, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, India, Israel, Jamaica, 
Japan, Jordan, Korea, Macedonia, 
Malta, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Serbia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
Ukraine 
 
*The dates for CEMAC, ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC are drawn from Carrere (2004). 
 